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There is growing interest in taxing the informal economy in developing 
countries. This paper examines the case for giving it greater priority, and 
suggests that policymakers and researchers should focus less on technical 
design issues, and more on strategies to encourage compliance, and to 
increase political and institutional incentives for reform.
Why tax the informal sector?
There are good reasons for the relative 
neglect of informal sector taxation: it offers 
limited potential for short-term increases in 
revenue; collection costs can be very high; 
and there are concerns that targeting small 
and micro businesses could have negative 
social and economic impacts. However, there 
could be indirect beneﬁ ts including building a 
culture of tax compliance among SMEs; 
reducing a sense of unfairness and hence 
encouraging tax compliance by formal ﬁ rms; 
and increasing economic growth of small 
ﬁ rms through the beneﬁ ts associated with 
formalisation, including better access to 
credit, markets and services. There could 
also potentially be broader governance gains 
if taxation encouraged effective collective 
action among informal sector operators, and 
more institutionalised channels for state-
society bargaining. While research evidence 
for many of these beneﬁ ts is still very 
preliminary, there is at the very least a good 
case for improving existing practices for 
taxing the informal sector which are often 
both ineffective and prone to abuse.
Policy options
There is a good deal of research into different 
policy options for taxing the informal sector. 
They include indirect taxation through taxes 
imposed higher up the value chain on goods 
and services that informal operators buy and 
sell; expanding the reach of existing formal 
sector taxes such as income tax and VAT; and 
widespread imposition of presumptive taxes 
on small ﬁ rms to get over high compliance and 
administrative costs. All of these have drawbacks 
in terms of revenue potential and /or broader 
development outcomes: indirect taxation
has limited impact on long-term compliance, 
does not offer potential growth beneﬁ ts
of formalisation, and is unlikely to spur 
governance gains; direct taxation has high 
administrative and compliance costs for very 
small ﬁ rms; and presumptive taxes can 
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impose disproportionately heavy burdens on 
small ﬁ rms if poorly designed. Moreover most 
existing research is narrowly focused on the 
costs and beneﬁ ts of compliance; to understand 
why progress in practice has been slow, and 
outcomes mixed, there is a need for more 
focus on a range of factors inﬂ uencing the 
incentives and capacity of small ﬁ rms to 
formalise and become tax compliant, and on 
the incentives of political leaders and tax 
administrators to pursue reform.
Incentives of small  rms for 
tax compliance
Incentives for tax compliance are closely 
linked to incentives for formalisation. Research 
suggests that tax evasion is not a primary 
reason for remaining informal, and that 
the wider costs of regulation including the 
time and resources needed to register, get 
licences and follow labour laws are important 
disincentives. Moreover, reducing the costs of 
tax compliance and regulation will not alone 
encourage formalisation. More pro-active 
strategies are needed to enhance the 
perceived beneﬁ ts including gaining access 
to credit, training, dispute resolution and 
other services; securing property rights; 
and reducing harassment. Policies are also 
needed to increase the capacity of small ﬁ rms 
to gain access to such beneﬁ ts. This could 
involve programmes to increase their skills 
but also measures to strengthen their capacity 
for collective action by increasing access 
to information about available services; 
addressing the issue of low government 
credibility; and improving co-ordination of 
informal sector actors, as well as their capacity 
to organise and bargain with government.
Strengthening political and 
administrative commitment 
to reform
Political leaders often have weak incentives 
to tax the informal economy: it raises little 
revenue, makes them unpopular, and 
formalisation may deprive them of inﬂ uence 
over voters. However they have potential 
interests in expanding the tax base and 
encouraging economic growth and job 
creation. While research evidence is lacking, 
reform is likely to be more politically feasible 
if there is greater compliance and support for 
formalisation from informal sector ﬁ rms, and 
institutional channels are created for engaging 
with them. Formal sector ﬁ rms may also 
constitute a source of support for reform as 
informal sector ﬁ rms are often competitors. 
More research is needed into ways of 
strengthening incentives of tax administrators 
to implement reform, including reorganisation 
of rewards, creation of specialist units to 
deal with the informal sector, and greater 
use of technology to reduce opportunities 
for harassment and collusion, and make 
collection less arduous and costly. 
Country cases
Examples from recent experience point to 
ways in which administrative and institutional 
reform can increase compliance by taxpayers 
and incentives for politicians and ofﬁ cials. 
They include specialist units for taxing the 
informal sector in Tanzania; delegating 
responsibility for tax collection to associations 
within the informal sector in Ghana; 
establishing clear links between tax payments 
and provision of services in Sierra Leone 
and Guinea; and encouraging compliance 
by offering a range of taxpayer services in 
the Gambia. Experience in Ethiopia and 
Cameroon illustrates the beneﬁ ts and risks of 
delegating greater control of informal sector 
taxation to subnational governments.
Implications for policymakers
In seeking more effective ways to tax the 
informal sector, future research and policy 
should focus less on reducing costs of 
compliance and more on strengthening 
incentives and collective action among 
different stakeholders, including:
• positive incentives for small ﬁ rms to comply 
with taxation and pursue formalisation;
• making reform more politically feasible 
and attractive to political leaders;
• strategic institutional reform to strengthen 
incentives for effective implementation;
• initiatives by states and governments to 
promote collective action by informal 
sector ﬁ rms and create institutionalised 
channels for engaging with them.
• increasing credibility of government and 
trust among SMEs and state authorities
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